Working Papers
Executive Constraints and Economic Growth. Working paper, 2026.
[ Abstract | Draft ]
Despite extensive research on democracy and development, the specific democratic institutions that drive economic growth remain unclear. This paper examines two forms of executive constraints: horizontal constraints, legislative checks on the executive; and vertical constraints, citizens' ability to hold executives accountable. While previous work emphasizes the role of horizontal constraints in securing property rights, I argue that vertical constraints primarily drive growth by expanding access to public goods. Using dynamic panel models, I find that vertical constraints significantly increase GDP per capita over time, whereas horizontal constraints have a negligible effect. I further test causal mechanisms, showing that horizontal constraints mainly encourage capital investment, whereas vertical constraints exert a stronger influence on human capital, leading to higher educational attainment, increased public spending, and lower infant mortality. These findings suggest that electoral contestation, not institutional checks on executive power, is the key democratic feature that facilitates economic development.
Do Democracies Pay Higher Wages? Working paper, 2026.
[ Abstract | Draft ]
The labor share of income—the proportion of national output that accrues to workers through wages, salaries, and benefits—has been declining over the past 50 years. This trend reflects an imbalance in the distribution of gains from economic growth, with workers and capital owners benefiting unequally. Much of the literature has overlooked how regimes shape the functional distribution of these gains between labor and capital. In this paper, I advance a theoretical framework that explains how democracy enhances workers’ relative organizational power and strengthens distributive mechanisms in the economy. By situating labor share dynamics within broader institutional contexts, this study contributes to debates on inequality and demonstrates how political regimes shape the distributive consequences of capitalism.