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Do Democracies Pay Higher Wages?

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Abstract

The labor share of income—the proportion of national output that accrues to workers through wages, salaries, and benefits—has been declining over the past 50 years. This trend reflects an imbalance in the distribution of gains from economic growth, with workers and capital owners benefiting unequally. Much of the literature has overlooked how regimes shape the functional distribution of these gains between labor and capital. In this paper, I advance a theoretical framework that explains how democracy enhances workers' relative organizational power and strengthens distributive mechanisms in the economy. By situating labor share dynamics within broader institutional contexts, this study contributes to debates on inequality and demonstrates how political regimes shape the distributive consequences of capitalism.

Keywords: democracy, labor share, wages, organizational power

Introduction

A substantial body of research documents that the proportion of the aggregate output of the economy that goes to wages, salaries and benefits to the labor force — the labor share of income — has been declining over the past 50 years (Mućk et al 2018). Scholars assert that this trend reflects a growing imbalance in the distribution of gains from economic growth and productivity, with workers and capital owners benefiting unequally. Economic growth has expanded total income, mainly in capital profits, but average wages and employment are flat or failing, sharply increasing income inequality (Kristal 2010; Piketty and Goldhammer 2014). This dynamic suggests a zero-sum conflict between labor and capital over the division of national income (Kristal 2010). As a result, wage earners are facing a declining share of income (Brown 2023), raising concerns about what Piketty describes as capitalism's potential to generate "arbitrary and unsustainable inequalities that radically undermine the meritocratic values on which democratic societies are based" (2014).

Advances in economic research identify that the decline in the labor share is determined by factors such as globalization, financialization, technological change, the decline of unions, and welfare state retrenchment (Stockhammer 2017). However, these studies mainly explain proximate changes in the labor share, leaving much of its variation unexplored (Guerriero 2019). Additionally, these approaches have failed to explain variation across developing countries or why countries with similar levels of technology or productivity differ in total labor compensation. To understand the fundamental causes driving the variation of the labor share, we must examine the underlying political institutions that produce such outcomes.[1] As Rodrik (1999) suggests, the political context in which labor markets

[1]This argument connects with the ongoing debate between proximate and fundamental determinants of development. For the proponents of this view, factors such as capital, labor, and technology are proximate sources and direct components of economic growth (North and Thomas 1973). If those factors rise, economic growth will increase. To understand what makes investment in capital, labor and technology possible, we need to examine the underlying institutions (fundamental causes) that produce such outcomes (Acemoglu et al 2005).

operate may be directly influencing wage outcomes.

This article reassesses a fundamental question in inequality research: the extent to which democracies redistribute functional income from capital to labor. First, I develop a theoretical account of how different institutional configurations affect the balance between productivity and labor compensation. Then, I empirically examine whether and to what extent democratization events enable workers to appropriate a larger share of national income. I test this relationship by constructing different treatment events related to the introduction of democratic political institutions, such as the universal suffrage and competitive elections. I also explore a broader range of political regimes to examine the effects of different authoritarian and semi-democratic settings on labor outcomes. Lastly, I provide a theoretical framework to explain why some democracies, particularly those with active citizen participation, tend to offer higher wages and better fringe benefits to their labor force.

1. Political regimes, inequality and labor dynamics

Far from being a stable ratio,[2] the labor share of income fluctuates with the changing balance between productivity growth and the compensation workers receive for their contribution to the economy. The labor share measures the proportion of an economy's aggregate output, typically GDP or total value added, that accrues to the labor force in the form of wages, salaries, and fringe benefits (Mućk et al 2018). Since the remainder of aggregate output accrues to capital, the labor share serves as a valuable indicator of how income is distributed between labor and capital across societies. Crucially, functional income distribution depends on the rate at which labor compensation grows relative to productivity. When productivity growth expands total income but workers' compensation stagnates, a larger share of output accrues to capital, leading to a decline in the labor share (Kristal 2010). Conversely, when wage growth outpaces productivity growth, labor captures a greater portion of income, and the labor share rises (Brown 2023).

Empirical research has devoted surprisingly little attention to the relationship between political regimes and the functional distribution of income. Seminal contributions instead focus on how political institutions shape labor-market outcomes, showing that democratic regimes are associated with higher manufacturing wages (Rodrik 1999), an effect largely mediated by the expansion and enforcement of labor standards (Palley 2005). Yet direct evidence on the impact of political institutions on the labor share remains scarce. Using cross-sectional data of two 5-year periods (2005–2009 and 2010–2014), Guerriero (2019) finds that a transition from absolute dictatorship to a full democracy increases the labor share by 14 to 34 percentage points. Bengtsson et al (2020) reach similar conclusions in their historical analysis of 20 European countries, documenting a decline in the capital share following radical institutional reforms such as the introduction of universal suffrage. More recently, Brown (2023) provides panel evidence from 119 countries between 1950 and 2017, showing that democratic institutions not only enable workers to capture a larger share of national income but also allow them to work fewer hours than their counterparts in authoritarian regimes.

While existing evidence suggests that democracy increases the labor share, the institutional mechanisms underlying this relationship remain insufficiently tested. Two non-mutually exclusive arguments dominate the literature. The first emphasizes how political regimes generate incentives for income redistribution, typically through electoral competition and median-voter dynamics. The second highlights how political institutions shape the working class's organizational capacity and ability to overcome collective action problems (Kristal 2010). I argue that the redistributive-incentives approach is limited for two reasons. First, it struggles to account for authoritarian regimes that

[2]The stability of the labor share was one of the *stylized facts* of economic growth in Kaldor (1961). This observation was consistent with the neoclassical assumption that labor and capital are each paid their marginal product (Kristal 2010, 736), implying that workers' compensation should be tied to productivity. However, further evidence has challenged this view. In practice, less-skilled workers have been increasingly confined to precarious, low-wage employment (Kalleberg 2009), a pattern associated with capital-biased technological change, and the erosion of workers' bargaining power (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003; Kristal 2010).

nonetheless engage in redistribution because their winning coalitions rely on the working class. Second, because it is closely tied to income inequality, this perspective is difficult to disentangle from concerns about reverse causality. By contrast, the organizational-power perspective provides a clearer causal pathway linking democracy to the labor share. Greater political participation enhances workers' capacity to organize, coordinate, and bargain for improved labor standards, thereby enabling them to appropriate a larger share of national income. The causal chain thus runs from political participation to bargaining power, and from bargaining power to the labor share. From this perspective, variation in the extent and intensity of political participation explains not only the average positive effect of democracy on the labor share but also substantial variation in labor share outcomes within and across regime types.

1.1 Democracy and income distribution

The link between regime type and the labor share is based on the literature on democracy and income inequality. Even though it is beyond the scope of this research to provide evidence on the causal direction between democracy and inequality, the labor share has been commonly used as a proxy for how unequal the income distribution of a society can be. A high labor share corresponds to a low level of inter-group inequality, as in most societies middle and lower classes are mostly wage earners, while capital income accrues to a smaller elite (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Theoretically, this relationship is based on the power resource theory, which regards income distribution as the outcome of a bargaining process between classes (Stockhammer 2015). This approach also aligns with the classical formulation, which posits that political competition reduces incentives to mobilize factors of production, including physical capital and labor supply (Przeworski and Limongi 1993). Political competition enables voters to employ the state as an instrument of wealth redistribution (Meltzer and Richard 1981). Given that the median voter typically possesses an income below the mean, "middle- and lower-income earners can use their voting power to tax the wealthy" (Pinto and Timmons 2005, 32), thereby attenuating incentives for factor accumulation. By contrast, authoritarian regimes may foster higher levels of factor mobilization precisely because their states are more isolated from particularistic societal pressures.[3] The rapid industrialization of South-East Asia illustrates this logic, as insulated, development-oriented states mobilized capital and labor to achieve sustained economic growth despite limited political competition.

- Contrast with dictatorships with broader bases and some participation. Single-party regimes with a winning coalition drawn from the working classes might produce more extensive redistribution than democracies (Knutsen 2015). This is the case in Cuba after the revolution, in the Soviet Union, and even in China under the Communist Party.
- Figure of the democratic difference weighting by population for autocracies described above.

1.2 Political participation as the key institutional feature

Following Brown (2023),[4] I construct Figure 1 to illustrate the relationship between the labor share and V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (Coppedge et al 2023), using country averages over the period 1960–2019. The figure reveals a positive but nonlinear association between democracy and the labor share: as electoral democracy increases, the labor share rises sharply at first, then flattens at intermediate levels. At the lower end of the index, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia, China, and Iran display persistently low labor shares. As democracy levels increase, the labor share rises rapidly; however, among hybrid regimes that combine democratic and authoritarian features, the relationship becomes more diffuse, with substantial cross-national variation. At the upper end of the

[3] Przeworski and Limongi (1993, 56) define state autonomy as "the combination of the state's ability to carry out development policies with its insulation from particularistic pressures, specifically those originating from large firms or unions."

[4] Brown (2023) plots the cross-country average of the labor share in 2017 with the mean of Polity IV Democracy score over the period 1950-2017.

spectrum, consolidated democracies, including the Nordic countries, Western Europe, and other advanced capitalist economies, combine high democratic scores with relatively high and stable labor shares.



Figure 1. Average labor share and electoral democracy index

This non-linearity is theoretically significant. While Brown (2023, 963) attributes the curvature mostly to measurement challenges in conceptualizing democracy as a continuous variable (Goldstone et al 2010), an alternative explanation emphasizes variation in democratic components. Consider, for example, two of the cases highlighted in Figure 1: Singapore and Taiwan. Between 1960 and 2019, both countries recorded similar average levels of electoral democracy (Singapore 0.38; Taiwan 0.36), yet they diverge sharply in the participatory and civil-society dimensions, as measured by V-Dem. Singapore's scores in the participatory (0.12) and civil-society (0.36) indexes are markedly lower than Taiwan's (0.36 and 0.50, respectively). This difference corresponds to contrasting labor shares: 0.43 in Singapore versus 0.73 in Taiwan. The comparison suggests that the participatory dimension of democracy underpins the capacity of democratic institutions to channel income toward labor.[5]

Additional comparative evidence reinforces this argument. Consider Brazil and Mexico, both situated in the middle of the democracy spectrum, with average V-Dem scores of 0.54 and 0.41, respectively. Despite comparable levels of electoral democracy, Brazil records a markedly higher labor share (0.53) than Mexico (0.41). This difference aligns with Brazil's stronger performance in the participatory and civil society components of democracy, as measured by V-Dem mid-level indices. Furthermore, according to Polity data, the two countries exhibit similar levels of executive

[5]Rodrik (1999) briefly observed a similar pattern when comparing Singapore and Taiwan, noting that the two countries exhibited opposite but symmetric configurations on Freedom House democracy components. Singapore was rated lower in political rights than in civil liberties, whereas the reverse was true for Taiwan. This pattern led Rodrik to conclude that political rights exerted a dominant influence on civil liberties in shaping democratic outcomes regarding wages. Moreover, Rodrik finds that among all Polity democracy components, only the competitiveness of political participation has a substantial effect on wages, an influence even stronger than that of the overall democracy index itself. Consistent with this observation, my analysis of Polity data shows that, while both countries do not vary substantially in terms of constraints on the executive (Singapore: 3.00; Taiwan: 3.99), Taiwan records a markedly higher score for the competitiveness of political participation (1.74) than Singapore (0.52).

constraints (Brazil 4.23; Mexico 4.06), yet Brazil scores substantially higher in the competitiveness of political participation (2.57 versus 1.64).

A similar pattern emerges beyond Latin America. Nigeria and Gabon, for instance, display relatively low democracy scores (0.30 and 0.27, respectively). However, Nigeria's higher labor share (0.68 versus 0.37) coincides with greater scores in both civil society participation (0.76 versus 0.45) and political participation (0.48 versus 0.39). Azerbaijan, another low-democracy case, also records a low labor share (0.36) consistent with its limited participatory and civil society indices (0.17 and 0.23). By contrast, Rwanda, despite having a slightly lower democracy score than Azerbaijan, exhibits a remarkably high labor share (0.76). Interestingly, Rwanda's mid-level democracy indices are modest overall, except for its relatively higher scores in participation (0.35) and civil society (0.40), levels only slightly lower than those observed in Taiwan.

These contrasts suggest that the relationship between democracy and the labor share is driven primarily by political participation and the organizational strength of civil society, rather than by liberal institutional features such as the rule of law, political stability, or formal labor rights (Rodrik 1999, 733). The fact that similar patterns of within-regime institutional variation appear across distinct datasets and democratic measures further strengthens this interpretation. Political participation expands workers' political voice, facilitates collective organization, and enhances their bargaining power vis-à-vis capital. This argument aligns with Kristal (2010), who conceptualizes changes in the labor share as the outcome of shifts in the working class's relative bargaining power across the economic, political, and global spheres. Through collective action—such as union organization and strike activity—workers can secure a larger share of national income by increasing employment and compensation while decreasing firms' profits (Kalleberg et al. 1984 in Kristal 2010). Democratic institutions contribute to this process by promoting and institutionalizing freedom of association, thereby increasing union density and strengthening labor's organizational power.

Beyond unionization, political participation enables workers to exert influence within the political sphere by supporting regimes and policies that foster a favorable environment for organized labor. Policies such as unemployment insurance, minimum wage legislation, and expanded social protection can be understood as mechanisms that reduce inequalities in employment relations (Kristal 2010, 739). Parties with strong ties to the working class—particularly those on the left—are more likely to advance redistributive policies that increase earnings and employment. More broadly, participatory institutions across regime types may raise labor compensation indirectly by expanding public goods and social services, including education, health care, and social insurance (Besley and Kudamatsu 2006; Lindert 2004; Mulligan et al 2004; Haggard and Kaufman 2020; Wang et al 2019; Gerring et al 2021). Importantly, similar effects have been documented in autocratic settings that incorporate participatory institutions, where increased participation is associated with improved public service provision (Miller 2015). Taken together, these arguments point to three principal channels through which political participation strengthens workers' organizational power and increases the labor share: union density, corporatist arrangements, and social spending.

- Briefly present the mechanism: participation leads to organizational power and then to labor share - Present the hypothesis

Hypothesis 1. Democracies allow labor to appropriate a larger share of national income than autocracies.

Hypothesis 2. Among democratic institutions, political participation enhances workers' organizational power.

Hypothesis 3. Across democratic and authoritarian regimes, increases in political participation account for higher labor shares.

These hypothesis explain that the difference between democracies and dictatorships, and changes in both regimes over time are due to levels of participation.

- Additional idea: Plot the evolution of the labor share against union density. Union density has

also been declining over the past few years. Potential link to democratic backsliding (Maybe use this in the conclusion as a potential implication).

Democratic systems empower workers to organize, bargain, and influence policy through legitimate political channels. As the electorate expands, the state becomes more accountable to the preferences of the median voter rather than those of a narrow elite (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Brown 2023). Democratic institutional features–such as universal suffrage, competitive elections, and freedom of association–broaden participation and shift political influence toward workers, who constitute the majority of the electorate and are typically supportive of redistribution (Pinto and Timmons 2005). Unlike autocratic regimes, democratic governments are more likely to implement labor-friendly policies, including higher wages, stronger labor protections, and expanded social welfare programs.

2. Research Design

This section outlines the empirical strategy used to analyze the relationship between democracy and the labor share. The baseline dataset covers 181 countries over the period 1950–2019, comprising 11,572 country-year observations. Labor share measures are drawn from the Penn World Table (PWT) version 10.01 (Feenstra et al 2015), which provides consistent coverage for up to 135 countries over the full sample period. Democracy is measured using the electoral democracy index from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al 2023), and the binary democracy variable drawn from the Classification of Political Regimes dataset from Cheibub et al (2010). Additionally, I used alternative democracy indicators, such as the Polity Revised Combined Score (Marshall and Gurr 2020), the Index of Democratization (Vanhanen 2019), the Dichotomous Coding of Democracy (Miller et al 2022), and the Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (LIED) (Skaaning 2021).

2.1 Modeling the relationship between democracy and the labor share

Previous studies showing a positive association between democracy and the labor share use cross-sectional analysis, grouping the data into five-year averages (see Rodrik 1999; and Guerriero 2019). According to this approach, this decision is appropriate because the effects of democracy should unfold over the long run rather than be explained by short-term variation. The challenge of this aggregation lies in accounting for potential within-country variation, which is especially important when the labor share is relatively persistent over time. This is also problematic when transitions or changes in political institutions are dramatic over the average period. To address these challenges, I employ both static and dynamic panel models, controlling for within-unit and over-time heterogeneity. My baseline model relies on an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator with country and year fixed effects in the following form:

$$Y_{ct} = \alpha_c + \delta_t + \xi D_{ct} + \omega X_{ct} + \varepsilon_{ct} \quad (1)$$

Y_{ct} denotes the share of labor compensation in GDP at current national prices for country c and year t, as measured by the Penn World Table. α_c captures country fixed effects, absorbing time-invariant differences across countries, while δ_t represents year fixed effects that control for common global shocks. ξ captures the effect of democracy D_{ct} as measured by the electoral democracy index in V-Dem (Coppedge et al 2023). Finally, ωX_{ct} controls for structural determinants correlated with economic development as measured by the log of GDP per capita in Fariss et al (2021).

The first question asks whether democracies systematically exhibit higher labor shares than autocracies. This is thus a question about levels: do more democratic political systems tend to allocate a larger share of income to labor? As a result, a continuous measure of democracy is adequate to capture this association, as previous accounts have theorized that democratic institutions are expected to strengthen workers' rights and promote labor-friendly policies.

- Results - Robustness using another variable

2.2 Dynamic effects

Brown (2023) is the only study suggesting a dynamic effect of democracy on the labor share. Brown's results rely on an Autoregressive Distributed-Lagged model with lag (1,0), meaning that a lagged dependent variable (LDV) is included on the right-hand side of the equation to control for persistence. As noted by previous research, the labor share changes considerably between countries but is relatively persistent over time (Guerriero 2019). The following specification replicates this model, but it includes two LDVs instead of one:

$$Y_{ct} = \alpha_c + \delta_t + \xi D_{ct} + \omega X_{ct} + \sum_{j=1}^{2} \tau_j Y_{ct-j} + \varepsilon_{ct} \tag{2}$$

Here, ξ, captures the effect of democracy D_{ct} measure as a dichotomous variable based on Cheibub et al (2010). The inclusion of LDVs substantially changes the nature of the research question to whether democratization, understood as a political transition or deepening of democratic institutions, leads to changes in the labor share over time. This is a dynamic question that focuses on adjustment processes rather than long-run differences in levels. In this view, democracy is treated not as a static attribute but as a political shock whose effects may unfold gradually through institutional and economic channels. The relevant coefficient captures whether changes in democracy alter the trajectory of the labor share, conditional on its past values.

- Nature of the question - Results - Robustness

2.3 Event Study Analysis

- Discussion about endogeneity and justification to introduce an identification strategy.

To estimate the dynamic effects of democracy on the labor share of income, I employ an event–study difference-in-differences specification of the following form:

$$Y_{ct} = \alpha_c + \delta_t + \sum_{k \neq -1} \beta_k \, 1(t - D_c = k) + \varepsilon_{ct}, \tag{3}$$

Y_{ct} denotes the share of labor income in GDP (average wage of employees) for country c and year t, as measured by the Penn World Table. α_c captures country fixed effects, absorbing time-invariant differences across countries, while δ_t represents year fixed effects that control for common global shocks. The indicators $1(D_{ct} = k)$ are a set of event-time dummies that equal one when the observation occurs k years before or after the introduction of universal suffrage, and zero otherwise. The coefficients β_k trace the evolution of the labor share around the reform year, with the period immediately preceding the reform ($k = -1$) omitted and serving as the reference category. Thus, each β_k measures the average change in the labor share k years relative to one year before the adoption of universal suffrage.

2.3.1 Suffrage-based treatment event

The primary operationalization of democratization relies on the staggered legal adoption of universal suffrage across countries. I construct the treatment event by defining D_{ct} as the event-time variable relative to the first year in which a country introduced universal voting rights—that is, the year in which virtually all adult citizens, female and male, became legally entitled to vote—as coded in the V-Dem historical/lexical suffrage indicator (Skaaning 2021). To address concerns about transient or symbolic enfranchisement reforms that were not durably implemented, I provide a robustness check requiring the $0 \rightarrow 1$ transition in suffrage to persist for at least three consecutive years before defining the treatment event. Appendix Table A1 lists all suffrage introduction years across the countries included in the sample.



Figure 2. Dynamic effects of the introduction of Universal Suffrage on the labor share

Figure 3 displays the estimated dynamic effects of the introduction of universal suffrage on the labor share of income, using the two-way fixed effects event-study specification described in Equation 1. The horizontal axis reports event time k, measured in years relative to the first year in which a country adopted universal suffrage. Negative values correspond to years before the reform, while positive values indicate years after its adoption. The vertical axis plots the estimated β_k coefficients from the event-time indicators, interpreted as the change in the labor share relative to the reference period one year before the reform ($k = -1$). Points represent coefficient estimates, and the vertical bars indicate their 95% confidence intervals. The figure thus summarizes how the labor share evolves before and after the expansion of suffrage, allowing for a visual assessment of both pre-trends and post-treatment dynamics.

Flat pre-treatment coefficients ($k < 0$) are very close to zero, not statistically significant, and show no clear trend upward or downward. This pattern strongly suggests that treated and not-yet-treated countries follow similar trajectories prior to the introduction of universal suffrage, supporting the credibility of the identification strategy and satisfying the *parallel trends* assumption. Following the reform (post-treatment coefficients when $k > 0$), the labor share begins to rise modestly in the short term and becomes substantively and statistically significant after approximately five years. In the medium- and long-run (10 to 20 years after the reform), universal suffrage increases the labor share by roughly 3–6 percentage points, with the effect persisting for several decades. These patterns are consistent with the mechanism proposed in Hypothesis 1. They also align with the literature (e.g., Brown 2023; Guerriero 2019), which finds large and persistent distributive effects of democratization.

2.3.2 Polyarchy-based treatment event

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Appendix 1. The decline of the labor share



Figure A1. Labor share over the past 50 years

Appendix 2. The democratic difference

Figure A1 plots the temporal evolution of the labor share for two groups of countries, one coded as democracies and the other as dictatorships, according to Miller et al (2022). The labor share of GDP is the proportion of GDP allocated to employees and the self-employed, as per the Penn World Table v.10 (Feenstra et al 2015). The data reveal clear regime-based differences. In dictatorships, the labor share of GDP is persistently lower and declines more sharply after the 1990s. Although both regimes exhibit a downward trend, democracies maintain relatively higher and more stable levels of labor share. Even during periods of global economic liberalization, democracies appear to act as a "safety net" (Knutsen 2021), mitigating the erosion of labor's share of national income.



Figure A2. Declining labor share in democracies and autocracies

Appendix 3. The Introduction of Universal Suffrage in the World

Table A1. Male Suffrage T_{cm} versus Universal (Female) Suffrage T_c

Country	T_{cm}	T_c	Country	T_{cm}	T_c	Country	T_{cm}	T_c
Afghanistan	1931	1964	Albania	1920	1946	Algeria	1946	1962
Andorra	1933	1970	Angola	1975	1975	Antigua & Barbuda	1951	1951
Argentina	1912	1947	Armenia	1991	1991	Australia	1896	1901
Austria	1896	1918	Austria-Hungary	–	–	Azerbaijan	1991	1991
Baden	–	–	Bahamas	1956	1956	Bahrain	1973	2002
Bangladesh	1971	1971	Barbados	1950	1950	Bavaria	–	–
Belarus	1991	1991	Belgium	1894	1949	Belize	1954	1954
Benin	1956	1956	Bhutan	2007	2007	Bolivia	1952	1952
Bosnia & Herzeg.	1990	1990	Botswana	1961	1961	Brazil	1985	1985
Brunei	–	–	Brunswick	–	–	Bulgaria	1879	1945
Burkina Faso	1957	1957	Burundi	1961	1961	Cambodia	1956	1956
Cameroon	1960	1960	Canada	1920	1920	Cape Colony	–	–
Cape Verde	1975	1975	Central African Rep.	1957	1957	Chad	1957	1957
Chile	1970	1970	China	1947	1947	Colombia	1853	1957
Comoros	1957	1957	Congo Brazzaville	1957	1957	Congo, D.R.	1960	1967
Costa Rica	1949	1949	Côte d'Ivoire	1957	1957	Croatia	1990	1990
Cuba	1901	1935	Cyprus	1959	1959	Czech Republic	1993	1993
Czechoslovakia	1920	1920	Denmark	1915	1915	Djibouti	1957	1957
Dominica	1951	1951	Dominican Republic	1865	1942	East Timor	1953	1953
Ecuador	1978	1978	Egypt	1923	1956	El Salvador	1883	1950
Equatorial Guinea	1968	1968	Eritrea	1952	1952	Estonia	1917	1917
Ethiopia	1955	1955	Fiji	1963	1963	Finland	1906	1906
France	1792	1944	Gabon	1957	1957	Gambia	1960	1960
Georgia	1991	1991	Germany	1871	1919	Germany, East	1945	1945
Germany, West	1949	1949	Ghana	1951	1951	Greece	1844	1956
Grenada	1951	1951	Guatemala	1956	1966	Guinea	1957	1957
Guinea-Bissau	1974	1974	Guyana	1952	1952	Haiti	1950	1950
Honduras	1894	1954	Hungary	1919	1919	Iceland	1915	1915

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Table A1 (continued)

Country	T_{cm}	T_c	Country	T_{cm}	T_c	Country	T_{cm}	T_c
India	1947	1947	Indonesia	1953	1953	Iran	1914	1963
Iraq	1924	1958	Ireland	1918	1918	Israel	1949	1949
Italy	1913	1946	Jamaica	1944	1944	Japan	1925	1952
Jordan	1947	1974	Kazakhstan	1990	1990	Kenya	1963	1963
Kiribati	1964	1964	Korea, North	1948	1948	Korea, South	1948	1948
Kosovo	2008	2008	Kuwait	1961	2006	Kyrgyzstan	1990	1990
Laos	1956	1956	Latvia	1918	1918	Lebanon	1927	1952
Lesotho	1965	1965	Liberia	1947	1947	Libya	1952	1964
Liechtenstein	1921	1984	Lithuania	1918	1918	Luxembourg	1919	1919
Macedonia	1990	1990	Madagascar	1957	1957	Malawi	1964	1964
Malaysia	1955	1955	Maldives	1965	1965	Mali	1960	1960
Malta	1947	1947	Marshall Islands	1950	1950	Mauritania	1957	1957
Mauritius	1950	1959	Mexico	1847	1953	Micronesia	1962	1962
Moldova	1991	1991	Monaco	1911	1962	Mongolia	1924	1924
Montenegro	2006	2006	Morocco	1962	1962	Mozambique	1975	1975
Myanmar	1948	1948	Namibia	1990	1990	Nauru	1951	1951
Nepal	1958	1958	Netherlands	1917	1922	New Zealand	1879	1893
Newfoundland	1925	1925	Nicaragua	1893	1957	Niger	1957	1957
Nigeria	1955	1977	Norway	1898	1913	Oman	2003	2003
Pakistan	1952	1952	Palau	1979	1979	Palestine	1996	1996
Panama	1903	1946	Papua New Guinea	1951	1964	Paraguay	1876	1961
Peru	1979	1979	Philippines	1973	1973	Poland	1919	1919
Portugal	1975	1975	Romania	1918	1946	Russia	1905	1917
Rwanda	1961	1961	Sahrawi	2008	2008	Samoa	1990	1990
San Marino	1909	1957	Sao Tome & Principe	1975	1975	Saudi Arabia	–	–
Senegal	1946	1946	Serbia	2006	2006	Seychelles	1967	1967
Sierra Leone	1958	1958	Singapore	1959	1959	Slovakia	1993	1993
Slovenia	1990	1990	Solomon Islands	1964	1964	Somalia	1956	1958
Somaliland	2003	2003	South Africa	1994	1994	South Sudan	2012	2012
Spain	1869	1931	Sri Lanka	1932	1932	St. Kitts & Nevis	1952	1952
St. Lucia	1951	1951	St. Vincent & Gren.	1951	1951	Sudan	1953	1964
Suriname	1949	1949	Swaziland	1964	1964	Sweden	1919	1919
Switzerland	1848	1971	Syria	1928	1953	Taiwan	1947	1947
Tajikistan	1990	1990	Tanzania	1963	1963	Thailand	1932	1932
Togo	1957	1957	Tonga	2010	2010	Trinidad & Tobago	1946	1946
Tunisia	1956	1959	Turkey	1921	1930	Turkmenistan	1990	1990
Tuvalu	1975	1975	USSR	1922	1922	Uganda	1962	1962
Ukraine	1991	1991	UAE	–	–	United Kingdom	1918	1928
United States	1965	1965	Uruguay	1918	1932	Uzbekistan	1990	1990
Vanuatu	1975	1975	Venezuela	1858	1946	Vietnam	1976	1976
Vietnam, North	1945	1945	Vietnam, South	1954	1954	Yemen	1990	1990
Yemen, North	1970	1970	Yemen, South	1967	1967	Yugoslavia	1920	1945
Zambia	1964	1964	Zanzibar	1963	1963	Zimbabwe	1979	1979